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1.2
AFTER CONFIDENTIALITY: RETHINKING THE
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESS
LAWYER
William H. Simon1
Recent business scandals and the regulatory responses to
them raise basic questions about the role of the business lawyer.
Lawyers were major participants in Enron and similar
controversies over corporate disclosure. They have been key
players in the corporate tax shelter industry. In both instances,
their conduct has prompted federal regulatory initiatives that
repudiate to an unprecedented degree the bar's traditional
understandings about its structure and obligations.
The provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
mandating "up-the-ladder" reporting by public corporation counsel
was the first federal statute in American history to regulate lawyers
directly and broadly.2 The second came only two years later -- the
"Jobs Act" provision imposing requirements on lawyers engaged in
shelter-like tax planning.3 Both initiatives are major abrogations of
the principle of professional "self-regulation" -- the name that both
the bar and social science give to the alliance of trade associations
and compliant state judiciaries that have traditionally asserted
regulatory authority over lawyers. And both these statutes unsettle
long-rooted conceptions of client loyalty.
The most frequent and vocal response of the organized
profession to these developments has been emphatic re-assertion of
1
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long-standing positions. In particular, the bar has been circling the
wagons around confidentiality. Virtually every major corporate
firm protested the SEC's "noisy withdrawal" proposal to require
public companies to report to the agency when their lawyers'
withdraw "for professional reasons" (as the companies have done
for years with respect to accountants).4 An American Bar
Association Task Force on Confidentiality is campaigning
vigorously against the practice of the Department of Justice of
requiring companies facing criminal charges to waive attorneyclient privilege with respect to internal investigations as a
condition of deferred prosecution.5
Such responses are unfortunate. The bar's claims about
corporate confidentiality are at best unsubstantiated and at worst
fraudulent. Regardless of whether the bar succeeds in beating back
the SEC's "noisy withdrawal" proposal and the Department of
Justice waiver demands, lawyer-client confidentiality cannot play
an important role in contemporary business regulation. Corporate
confidentiality is dead, and the bar's attempt to suggest that things
could be otherwise is an exercise in myth-making.
A deeper objection to the bar's current pre-occupations is
that they largely ignore the basic issues posed by recent scandals
and regulatory responses.
Two issues are critical. The first is
formalism -- the doctrine that only the letter of the law and not its
spirit is binding. The bar has long had trouble defending
formalism, but it has never been able to renounce it either.
The second problem concerns the meaning of client loyalty
when the client is an organization. Although a major fraction of
the bar has represented corporations more or less exclusively for
more than a century, the bar's norms of practice have tended to
speak of clients as if they were individuals. They have thus tended
to ignore the internal conflicts of interest that differentiate
4
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organizational from individual clients. Lawyers have a strong
tendency to identify their corporate clients with management.
They know that in principle the corporation is not the same thing
as its management. But they have no clear conception of what else
it could be. Thus, in spite of themselves, they instinctively fall
back on views that conflate the organization and its personnel.
The confusion around these issues undermines the most
fundamental claim of modern professionalism -- that professionals
can simultaneously serve client interests and the public interest.
Loyalty to clients is consistent with the public interest because
client trust enables professionals to induce socially desirable
behavior. In the case of lawyers, the social payoff is compliance
with law. Thus, the bar's rationale for corporate confidentiality is
that it induces more consultation with lawyers, which in turn
enhances both the client's ability to pursue its own interests and
compliance with law.6 But even if we concede that corporate
confidentiality induces legal consultation -- a concession to be
mostly retracted below -- the claim is implausible without
clarification of the ideas of "compliance" and client interests in the
corporate context. If the "compliance" that lawyers induce means
no more than conformity to the law's literal terms, we have little
reason to consider it of social value. And before we can conclude
that confidentiality serves the interests of corporate clients, we
need an explanation that clearly distinguishes between corporate
and managerial interests.
There may be a promising emerging conception of
compliance, and the business lawyer's role in it, implicit in a range
of recent regulatory developments and some relatively lowvisibility activities of some business lawyers. I am thinking of
some aspects of securities regulation, such as the "internal
controls" requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, as well as a broad range
of "management-based" regulatory regimes that include the
hazardous substance regulations of the Occupational Health and
6
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Safety Administration, Project XL of the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point food
safety regime of the Department of Agriculture.7 Suggestive
lawyer activities include the work of the tax section of the New
York State Bar Association.8 These activities have implications
for the problem of client interest as well compliance, and they
imply responses to the issues of formalism and client identity.
I. FORMALISM AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Enron "special purpose entities" and tax shelters share a
strong resemblance.
They are both complex transactions
structured and executed by multidisciplinary professional teams for
very large fees for the sole purpose of circumventing legal
constraints. They have no "business purpose", and they manifestly
frustrate the public purposes underlying the relevant laws.
The Enron "Raptor" transactions were structured so that
illiquid investments that managers expected to decline could be
removed from the company's financial statements. Notes from the
board meeting approving one set of these deals described them as a
"hedge" but then noted, "Does not transfer economic risk but
transfers P[rofit] & L[oss] volatility".9 The COBRA tax shelters
were currency option transactions the sole purpose of which was to
create economically fictitious losses that would offset
economically real capital gains.
Henry Camferdam, an
entrepreneur who sold his technology company in 1999 for about
$70 million, was introduced to the idea when an Ernst & Young
accountant called to say, as reported by the American Lawyer, that
E & Y "had a plan that would make that capital gain disappear."
7
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Legal opinions from Jenkins & Gilchrist and Sidley Austin Brown
& Wood would provide "insurance."10
The professionals defended these transactions, and they still
do. The defense depends on formalism. The defenders do not
dispute that the transactions frustrate the purposes of the relevant
laws. Rather, they argue, first, that the deals complied with the
literal terms of the law, and second, that compliance with its literal
terms was all that the law required. Both propositions are
controversial. It has been strongly argued that many of the Enron
transactions and tax shelters did not comply even with the literal
terms of the law. Moreover, it is a matter of dispute whether the
securities and tax laws should be interpreted to require only literal
compliance. The securities laws have very broad definitions of
fraud and other prohibited practices that seem to call for purposive
interpretation, but at least some lawyers suggest that literal
compliance with accounting rules should sometimes be sufficient,
even for otherwise misleading practices.11 In the tax area, judicial
authority seems more or less evenly divided between literalist and
purposive approaches to compliance.12
But I am less interested in the specific mandates of the tax
and securities laws than in the professionals' general understanding
of their obligations to law and the public interest and how that
understanding shapes their conception of role. All lawyers are
formalists some of the time. No corporate lawyer would refuse to
assist in a freeze-out merger with a shell corporation solely
because the transaction is not really a business combination but a
forced buy-out. Nor would any refuse to execute a "poison pill"
takeover defense on the ground that the "pill" is not really the
10
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dividend it purports to be but rather a device for expanding board
power without a shareholder vote. Although each manoeuvre
depends on a formalistic interpretation of the relevant statute, the
courts have approved each, and there are substantial reasons to
think it can be consistent with public policy.13
Some lawyers, however, are formalists all the time, or at
least, they are always ready to be formalists when doing so would
serve client interests. They will invoke the public interest when
that helps the client, but they do not feel constrained by any public
interest that is not fully articulated in positive rules. They thus
stand ready to exploit "loopholes" and "technicalities" -- formal
interpretations of rules that thwart their underlying purposes.
For a substantial segment of the bar, such formalism is a
key feature of the professional ideal. In the debate about Vinson &
Elkins's work for Enron, Lawrence Fox of the ABA Ethics 2000
Commission insisted, "Clients are entitled to know there are
loopholes…. If you want to change that, you have to rewrite the
law."14 Stephen Gillers of NYU Law School said, "The job of the
lawyer is to accomplish the client's goals within the law and if that
can only be done through a technicality, that is not the lawyer's
fault."15
There is, of course, another view. It was concisely
expressed by the Enron accountant Sherron Watkins in her famous
memo to Ken Lay. She made no mention of any of the accounting
rules Arthur Andersen and Vinson & Elkins relied on. Instead, she
noted that,
13

The formalism involved in the freeze-out merger and the poison pill
resemble the type defended in Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967). Language is
stretched away from its original purposes in order to accommodate current
social norms in a changed environment. A key feature of the more defensible
forms of this practice is that they are sufficiently transparent to be subject to
review by public officials. By contrast, a key feature of the Enron-style earnings
games and tax shelters is that they presuppose or exacerbate inadequate public
accountability. Enron was trying to hide information from the public, and tax
shelter strategies depend on the IRS's inadequate enforcement resources.
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The overriding basic principle of accounting is that
if you explain the 'accounting treatment' to a man on the
street, would you influence his investing decision? Would
he sell or buy the stock based on a thorough understanding
of the facts? If so, you best present [such facts]
correctly….16
This appeal to "overriding basic principle" contrasts
markedly with the preoccupation of the Andersen accountants and
the V & E lawyers with the technical requirements of Financial
Accounting Standards Board standards. There is no indication that
these professionals ever asked the question, "Is this misleading?,"
or if they did -- as in a section of V & E's response to the Watkins
letter headed "Bad Cosmetics"17 -- considered the answer relevant
to the permissibility of the transaction.
Among securities lawyers, the most articulate speakers are
defenders of formalism, and those who have doubts tend silent or
ambiguous. But the tax bar is openly divided, and a major
contingent of practitioners, many in the big established firms, have
taken a strong position against what they, along with the IRS, call
"abusive" tax practice. They oppose the new shelter practice as
socially "inefficient." While the securities lawyers have opposed
SEC regulation of their practice with remarkable uniformity, the
anti-shelter tax faction, led by the tax sections of the American Bar
Association and, especially, the New York State bar, have
supported IRS initiatives and even called for their strengthening.
They support demanding "due diligence" requirements for shelter
opinions, and even, in some cases, the requirement that
practitioners make shelter client lists available to the IRS.18

16
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Note the difference between the premises of the defenders
of Vinson & Elkins and those of the New York tax section. The
idea of a "loophole" -- a course of action that fits the letter but
violates the spirit of the law -- is unintelligible to the former. To
them, as Gillers put it, "it's either legal or it isn't."19 But the New
York tax section accepts the IRS's premise that there is an
important category of "abusive" practices that can be identified
independently of the literal terms of the law.
The practitioners on both sides of the formalism debate are
not just arguing about the characteristics of prevailing law. The
formalists do not argue only that they should give their clients the
benefit of formalistic manipulation because the law creates or
accepts those benefits. The anti-formalists do not argue only that
literal compliance is insufficient because that's what the law says.
Indeed, what we might call the legal positivist case for formalism - lawyers should be formalist because the law is formalist -- is
much stronger in the tax area, where the bar is divided, than in the
securities area, where formalism is virtually unchallenged. In the
tax area, there has long been an "economic substance" doctrine that
condemns literal but counter-purposive positions, but it has never
been uncontested. Yet, there has also been a minority position that
formal compliance is enough (and it seems to have gained ground
in recent years).20 In the securities area, however, it is hard to
square formalism with the open-ended nature of the securities acts'
fraud norms and with the accountant's practice of opining with
respect to financial statements, not only that they comply with
GAAP, but that they "fairly and accurately" portray the financial
condition of the company. Vinson & Elkins position implies that a
financial statement can be knowingly misleading ("bad cosmetics")
and yet, so long as it complies with GAAP, non-fraudulent. There
is no authority for this position, and some against. Most
importantly, the language of the securities laws prohibit statements
that are "misleading" tout court. It is hard to find loopholes in such
19
20
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terms. Yet, formalism flourishes more in the securities area even
more than in the tax area.
Clearly then lawyers are not simply taking the law as they
find it. They are arguing for and against formalism because they
see stakes for society and for themselves in these issues. The
stakes for the profession involve lawyers' own sense of self-respect
and dignity, the image of themselves they present to their clients,
and the profession's image before the public.
The lawyer image that best justifies formalist practice is
libertarian. It sees government action as presumptively suspect
and the lawyer as performing a valuable role in forcing greater
clarity in the norms that authorize and regulate such action.
Lawyers market themselves to their clients as champions
committed to minimizing the interference of government with their
pursuit of their private goals. They justify themselves to the public
as an essential institution of government restraint. Formalist
evasion pushes the rule-maker to articulate its goals more
precisely. The cycle of evasion and re-articulation moves upward
to greater completeness and clarity. Completeness and clarity is
good because it increases people's ability to plan their affairs. It is
further valued as an engine of democracy. Informal interpretation,
John Manning complains, "relieves the legislature of both the
responsibility and accountability for doing" its job.21
Many lawyers will not be comfortable with the libertarian
premise that we should be categorically more wary of government
activity than of business activity. But whatever one thinks of this
starting point, formalism does not follow. Both the certainty and
the accountability arguments for formalism are unconvincing.
The certainty argument ignores that increased certainty for
some people may imply reduced certainty for others. And it is
wrong in asserting any strong correlation between formalistic
legality and the social experience of predictability or control of
one's life. For most people in many realms of life, predictability is
21
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best furthered by laws that track ordinary social expectations, and
that will often be an informal legality.22 Enron illustrates both
points. Whatever certainty formalistic interpretation gave to
Andrew Fastow and his cronies, it produced disruptive surprise for
most the other stakeholders in the company. And an interpretation
of the rules that conditioned off balance sheet finance on a
disinterested informal judgment about where it made sense would
have produced disclosures that would have been more accurately
interpreted than the formalistic manipulations that were used.
As for accountability, note to begin with, that formalists do
not confine their efforts to settings in which there are wellfunctioning processes of policy monitoring and revision. On the
contrary, one of the disturbing features of Enron-style securities
practice and tax shelter practice is that they depend on or
exacerbate weaknesses in processes of public enforcement and
oversight.
Thus, Enron used literalistic interpretation of
disclosure norms to justify the concealment of information that
would have been needed for public appraisal of its practices. Tax
shelter practice is designed to exploit the IRS's limited audit and
litigation resources. Lawyers' advice in favor of aggressive tax
positions has been influenced by the low probabilities that public
authorities will detect their practices, and practitioners have gone
to elaborate lengths to make it hard for the agency to identify its
products. Legislative revision to take account of practices that
never come to light is unlikely.
More generally, the demand of formalism that government
specify fully the obligations of citizens before enforcement
22

What has been promulgated or announced beforehand will often be only a
very imperfect formulation of principles which people can better honour in
action than express in words. Only if one believes that all law is an
expression of the will of a legislator and has been invented by him, rather
than an expression of the principles required by the exigencies of a going
order, does it seem that previous announcement is an indispensable
condition of knowledge of the law.
1 Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order 117-18
(1973).
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increasingly seems both too strong and too weak a condition of
accountability. Too strong because the government lacks the
ability to anticipate and specify in advance the full range of
situations to which public norms apply. The increase in recent
decades in the pace of innovation in financial markets has
exacerbated this problem. Even if public enforcement resources
were more balanced with private evasion resources than they are,
the government could not keep up with the capacities of
professionals advising the private sector for evasive innovation.
Joe Bankman suggests that the ultimate practical result of a
consistently formalist tax regime would be that no tax would be
collected from anyone with access to good professional advice.23
One might also predict that the result of a consistently formalist
securities disclosure regime would be that all corporate wealth
would be expropriated by insiders.
But in other respects formalism is a weak condition of
accountability. Formalism demands only that norms be specified;
nor that they serve their purposes. A formalist regime breeds, not
only counter-purposivist evasion, but counter-purposivist
compliance -- costly activity dictated by the literal terms of rules
that make little contribution to their underlying purposes.
Formalism imposes no constraints on the substance of norms.
Thus, the Enron-era crisis of under-compliance has been followed
by a crisis of over-compliance in the implementation of the
"internal controls" provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. The statute
requires management to certify the adequacy of the company's
financial controls, and managers necessarily depend on
accountants for this function. The statute and regulations are not
specific on what adequacy means. The accountants, encouraged
by their regulator (the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board) and empowered by their oligopolistic industry structure,
chose to interpret the statute in a way that served no purposes but
their own. They over-reacted to minor deficiencies and demanded
costly safeguards out of proportion to the magnitudes of the risks
23
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involved. They minimized liability risk to themselves and
generated enormous fees, but they imposed unjustified costs on the
companies and the public.24
Donald Nicolaisen, chief accountant at the SEC, recently
complained about the "compliance mindset", by which he meant
both evasive and defensive formalism. In rhetoric strikingly
reminiscent of Sherron Watkins's forlorn exhortation, he suggested
that those who prepare financial statements should ask themselves
what kind of information they rely on in making their own
investment decisions and then use the answer as a guide to
deciding how to report on their clients.25 In the current climate, the
idea that the information lawyers and accountants produce under
the securities law should be useful to anyone comes easily only to
mavericks or government officials.
The libertarian/formalist model of lawyering has become a
liability for lawyers. The wedge that formalism drives between
legal norm and public purpose undermines the profession's claim
that its services have public value. This is increasingly true as the
image of formalist evasion as the price of a cycle of progressive
clarification of law comes to seem less plausible than the image of
a downward spiral of reciprocally exacerbating legal rigidity and
opportunistic evasion.
There is another dimension to the problem.
The
libertarian/formalist vision disables the professions from
responding to the demands and opportunities of a style of
regulation that has become increasingly prominent in recent
decades. Sarbanes-Oxley is a recent example of this critical trend.
The trend extends to education (the No Child Left Behind Act),
environmental law (e.g., Project XL or Habitat Conservations
Plans), product safety (e.g., Hazard Analysis and Critical Control

24
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25
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Points regime in food safety), occupational health and safety (e.g,
OSHA's hazardous substance program), and many other areas.
These regimes are a response to the problems that defeat
formalism -- that the regulator never knows as much about the
problems she regulates as the regulated, that even if she were
omniscient she could never express her understanding in sufficient
detail to preclude ambiguity, and that the problem and potential
solutions change more rapidly than the regulations can be
revised.26
In the emerging approach to regulation, the regulator looks
to the regulated to identify problems and solutions and to
continuously revise her understanding of both. The regulator
promises leniency, flexible accommodation, and technical
assistance in exchange for transparency and collaborative
information-sharing on the part of the regulated. Among the
characteristics features of these legal regimes are substantive
norms that are deliberately under-specified coupled with duties on
the part of the regulated party to themselves identify and clarify the
ambiguities in the norms. The "management discussion and
analysis" requirement of the '34 Act is an early example, and the
Sarbanes-Oxley requirement that management assess the strengths
and weaknesses of its "internal controls" is a newer one.27 In such
measures, the regulator elaborates goals, and rather than telling the
regulated exactly what she should do in order to attain them, orders
the regulated to herself identify the most effective responses and to
both report and implement them.
Moreover, explicitly or
effectively, these regimes charge the regulated with a duty to
disclose to the regulator deficiencies in the regulators formulation
of the rules. An example is the provision proposed for (but
ultimately left out of) the Restatement of Torts 3d on the preemptive effect of administrative regulation in products liability
cases. Compliance with administrative requirements immunizes
the manufacturer from tort liability if she has disclosed to the
26
27
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regulator any information she has suggesting that the requirements
are inadequate.28 The provision of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines that treats as a significant mitigating factor for
corporate liability the adoption of reasonable compliance
procedures is in the same spirit.29
In an important sense, these new regimes are a vindication
of the legitimate goal of the libertarian/formalist vision -- the
progressive clarification of law. Like the libertarians, the new
reforms aspire to produce a progressively clarifying cycle of
revision, but one that moves much faster. Although the core
governing norms are typically expressed in general terms, both
regulators and practitioners are expected to describe their practices
as explicitly as possible. Yet in the new regimes, normative
specification is genuinely a means to clarification and
understanding, not a shield from the pressures of public
accountability. Where form diverges from purpose, practitioners
are supposed at least to signal that to the public in a way that
facilitates convergence. They must report deficiencies in the
regulations to the regulators. And where the norms are ambiguous
as to what they demand, those subject to them have a duty at least
to make their conduct transparent to the regulators, so that they can
assess whether the norms require re-articulation.
These regimes try to co-opt the more technologically
dynamic, socially responsible, and image-conscious members of
the relevant industries. These firms are not averse to standards that
enhance public confidence in the industry and its products,
especially if the standards are generally enforced so that their
competitors are precluded from offering lower prices by ignoring
them. This means that in any given field of practice the client
community is likely to divide in their attitudes toward regulation.
High-road clients will support regulation and want to participate in
a way that makes the new regimes work. Low-road clients will
want to minimize regulatory burdens any way they can. The high28
29
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road constituency means that lawyers who have a professional
stake in associating their work with the vindication of the public
purposes underlying the regime will have political allies when the
work collectively for both regulatory and professional reforms that
undercut opportunities for formalistic evasion. It also means that
there will be demand from these clients for lawyering services that
require both skills and attitudes different from those associated
with formalistic evasion (or defensive formalism). These new
skills involve the ability to assess and revise norms and
institutional structures in the light of their evolving purposes. This
is not a radical idea. It is quite similar to the vision of lawyering
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks expounded in the 1950s.30 Recent
developments in the economy and regulation have enlarged the
opportunities for it. However, at the same time, we have a seen a
revival of the libertarian/formalist rival of this vision.
A potential role for the bar organizations in the new regime
is to facilitate aggregation of information and collective
deliberation among practitioners about emerging perceptions of
problems in the existing regulatory apparatus and ways for
improving them. Lawyers should be among the first to perceive
the problems, and if they shared information and ideas, they would
be in a good position to formulate advice and proposals for the
regulators. Such a role is well within the traditional commitments
of bar associations to public service and law reform. It would be a
difficult role for an inclusive or integrated bar representing all the
lawyers in a jurisdiction. Lawyers with ideologies of their own or
clients that committed them to low-road strategies of resistance or
evasion would not support such activities. But voluntary bar
associations with "high-road" members might be attracted to them.
The efforts to the tax section of the New York State Bar
Association mentioned above suggest the possibilities.
It seems doubtful that the libertarian/formalist view and the
emerging "new-governance" view reflected in the new regulatory
30

Henry M. Hart and Albert Sacks. The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law 209-40 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip
Frickey, ed.s, 1994).
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developments can be accommodated within a single professional
vision. If the bar is to have a common vision of its role and
responsibilities, it must choose. The choice is not dictated by
either tradition or self-interest. But the newer approach has the
best promise of vindicating the bar's claim that its service to
private clients furthers public interests, and it seems to present the
best opportunities to enhance the bar's social influence and status.
II. ORGANIZATIONS AND CLIENT LOYALTY
In its defense of its work for Enron, Vinson & Elkins said,
"When clients ask us [if they can do something] our job is to …
figure out if there is a legally appropriate way to do it. That's what
we do. And so does every other law firm in America."31 I've been
focusing on how we understand the idea of "lawful", and
especially the relative roles of letter and spirit. Now I want to turn
to the idea of "client" presupposed by this rhetoric.
To suggest that a corporation lawyer's duty to her client
requires her to do her best to effectuate a manager's request to find
a lawful way to withhold information from the shareholders is to
suggest that the manager is the client. Every corporation lawyer
knows that the manager is not client. Yet, most corporation
lawyers think and talk much of the time as if the manager were the
client. Moreover, few corporation lawyers have a coherent idea of
what a corporate client could be other than the manager.
The bar's rhetoric shows a strong tendency alternately to
imply that the manager is the client and to beg the question of
what, if the client is not the manager, it is. In its vigorous
opposition to the SEC's "noisy withdrawal" proposal, the bar
repeatedly invoked Justice Burger's distinction between, on the one
hand, the lawyer as "loyal representative whose job is to present
the client's case in the most favorable possible light," and on the
other, the accountant -- a "watchdog" whose "ultimate allegiance is
to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as the
31
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investing public."32 The distinction raises the question of what,
once we exclude creditors, shareholders, and the investing public,
remains for the corporate lawyer to be loyal to. Managers are the
first group to come to mind, but they are not necessarily a more
deserving one.
Until 1982, about a century after the emergence of modern
corporate law practice, professional responsibility doctrine spoke
of clients only as solitary individuals. Finally, the ABA produced
Model Rule 1.13, which acknowledged that organizations were
distinctive. The basic idea of Model Rule 1.13 was that agents -managers -- should be treated as speaking for the client when they
had authority to do so.33 This was plausible but ambiguous. The
rule provided more specific guidance for one troubling category of
situations: In essence, it said that when managers are acting
illegally in ways likely to harm the corporation the lawyer should
think about going to the board. Although the disciplinary rules did
not address it specifically, there was another category of situations
where corporate and civil procedure doctrine suggested that
lawyers should stand back from managers -- where the managers
had a clear and explicit conflict of interest, notably, with respect to
compensation arrangements and derivative suits against them.
Here the doctrine prescribed that managers get their own lawyers,
and corporate counsel again take instruction from the board.34
Key ambiguities remained. Two are especially important.
First, what was the lawyer supposed to do when the board was
encouraging or acquiescing in managerial lawlessness? If we take
seriously the principle that only authorized conduct can be
attributed to the organization, then the board can no longer be
regarded as speaking for the client. In this situation, the inference
would be natural that the best way to protect the corporation's
interests would be for the lawyer to consult the shareholders, the
corporate constituency that would usually have the greatest stake
32
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and to whom the law gives authority to remove the directors. In
addition or in the alternative, it might seem necessary to go to
government agencies with supervisory authority over the
corporation. Yet, when the SEC suggested in the famous National
Student Marketing case that lawyers might go to the shareholders
or in its Sarbanes-Oxley "noisy withdrawal" proposal that they
should send a weak signal to the SEC itself, the bar rebelled. Most
strikingly, it opposed such responsibilities on the ground that they
undermined loyalty to the client.35 Again, lawyers seemed to be
forgetting that the managers were not the client.
Second, how is the lawyer to understand managerial
lawlessness? In particular, should any managerial breach of
fiduciary duty be deemed lawless, hence triggering duties to go to
the board (and perhaps beyond)? In practice, lawyers interpreted
lawless to mean either breach of criminal or regulatory law on the
one hand or explicit conflict of interest situations on the other. But
that left a range of decisions that were potentially breaches of
fiduciary duty but not violations of specific legal commands or
explicit conflicts. Takeover defense, for example. To require
lawyers to routinely pass judgment on whether managerial
decisions on such matters are in the shareholders interests seems
implausible, but routine deference to such decisions seems to
ignore patent, if indirect, conflicts of interest.
It happens that an interesting sub-category of such
judgments includes financial reporting issues of the Enron variety.
Enron's managers were not unusual in devoting major time and
effort to conduct the only purpose of which was to create a
favorable effect on its financial statements. Public corporation
managers are constantly proposing and executing transactions
intended to improve their accounting numbers or structuring
transactions they would otherwise undertake in a way to induce a
desired appearance on financial statements.
"Earnings
management" is one name for it, and although it is controversial, it
35
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is more or less shamelessly indulged, if not promoted, by business
professionals of all stripes. Long after the negative publicity about
its Enron activities began, Vinson & Elkins continued to advertise
on its website its expertise in the use of offshore entities to help
businesses achieve "off balance sheet treatment" for debt.
Of course, many types of earnings management violate the
securities laws. It is even arguable that earnings management
activities should be deemed presumptive violations of the
securities laws. But the question to consider at this point is
whether even otherwise lawful earnings management can ever be
consistent with managerial fiduciary duties to their corporations.
When the manager asks the lawyer, accountant, or banker to assist
in earnings management he is proposing to withhold or obscure
information that shareholders would consider relevant to their
investment decisions. Why isn't such a proposal a presumptive
breach of fiduciary duty? It is no answer that the manager's duties
are to the corporation, not the shareholders. The corporation's
interests embrace the shareholders' interest in unbiased financial
reporting. What if the manager asserts that the accounting
treatment she is trying to achieve would be more reflective of the
true financial condition of the company? This position has little
credibility when the manager is seeking to withhold information
entirely, rather than just influence its presentation. Even where the
manager's plan affects only presentation, it is questionable whether
she should be heard on such subjects. Financial accounting is the
most important mechanism of managerial accountability. To give
managers influence over it is like allowing students to grade their
own exams.36
I don't mean to suggest that how much lawyers should
defer to managerial assertions about the interests of their corporate
clients is an easy question. On the contrary, my point is precisely
36
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that it is a hard question. The bar, however, has not treated it as
such. That Vinson & Elkins could see its participation in the
Enron deceptions as a matter of loyalty to its client bespeaks deep
confusion that seems to arise from a failure to treat seriously the
meaning of organizational representation.
We see the same confusion in the bar's anxiety about the
pressures on corporate attorney-client confidentiality. I argued
above that the formalism problem undermines the claim that legal
advice promotes some socially desirable form of compliance. It is
time to observe another implausible feature of the argument for
corporate confidentiality -- the contention that confidentiality plays
an important role in inducing managers to confer with the
corporation's lawyers. The bar's arguments often seem to assume
that the privilege belongs to the managers. Of course, the
confidentiality proponents must know that this is not the case; the
privilege belongs to the organization. But if the proponents really
understand this, it is difficult to see how they can think that
confidentiality is important in inducing disclosure to counsel.
Consider: Because the privilege belongs to the
organization, the organization can waive it no matter how costly
disclosure is to the manager. In fact, we know that corporations
often cooperate in prosecutions against errant former managers in
order to gain leniency for themselves.37 And they sometimes sue
former managers for damages for wrongdoing. Boards have a
fiduciary duty to sacrifice managers when it's in the interest of the
organization to do so. And the decision to waive is made by the
board sitting at the time of the waiver decision, not the one sitting
at the time of the communication.38 Thus, a current board cannot
be sure that a future board will not waive privilege with respect to
the current board's communications. Moreover, the privilege puts
37
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no constraint on disclosure within the organization. A corporate
lawyer who learns about wrongdoing from a manager will often
have a duty to report the facts to the manager's superiors.
Recall also that the privilege protects only the
communication and not the information it contains. This means
that, when a corporate lawyer learns something that has to be
disclosed under the civil discovery or securities laws the privilege
does not affect his duty to see that the information gets disclosed,
whether or not the communicating manager wishes it to be.
Given these longstanding limits on the privilege, it has
always been irrational for a manager to make disclosures to
corporate counsel that she would not have been willing to make in
the absence of any confidentiality safeguards. If managers are
more wary now, it is probably because recent scandals have made
them more alert to the longstanding limits, not because of the new
practices by prosecutors. (Fortunately, managers have strong
incentives to make disclosures without confidentiality. Aside from
whatever sense of responsibility to the organization they may have,
they risk liability by not disclosing. For example, they may lose
the "business judgment" defense to civil claims and the "advice of
counsel" defense to civil ones.)
The rationale for confidentiality in the corporate context
has always been out of phase with the contours of the doctrine. If
our only concern is to induce managerial communication to
lawyers, we should give the privilege to the managers. We don't.
The privilege belongs to the corporation with the consequence that
a board can waive at the expense of errant officers, and a successor
board can waive at the expense of an errant past board. This
means that corporate counsel can never assure managers of strong
confidentiality.
Clearly, there is a competing consideration that holds us
back from following out the logic of the confidentiality rationale. I
am unaware of any articulation of this consideration, but I think it
is clear enough -- client loyalty. If the bar's argument were right,
giving the privilege to the manager might actually induce more
compliance. But it would not be tolerable because it would too
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often require the lawyer to remain silent in the face of conduct that
was both unlawful and harmful to her organizational client. To
preclude the lawyer from intervening to prevent lawless harm to
the client would affront all the values that give dignity to the
professional role.
There is thus a strong tension between the goal of
managerial trust and that of corporate client loyalty. If managerial
trust in lawyers is based on confidentiality, rather than a shared
sense of loyalty to the organization's goals and norms, it will have
to come at the expense of client loyalty.
Confronting this tension more squarely might lead the bar
to take a less hostile attitude toward the new regulatory initiatives
that are compromising confidentiality. The demands to cut back
confidentiality do not occur in isolation. More often than not, they
are part of the approach to regulation I mentioned earlier that
aspires to combine transparency with leniency and flexibility in
order to induce collaborative continuously revised public-private
ordering. At least, some corporate clients have an interest in
embracing these new approaches.
The assistance that lawyers can best provide in these new
regimes has less to do with keeping secrets and more to do
problem-solving, devising more efficient and flexible responses
that reconcile the client's legitimate interests with the public
purposes of the regulatory regimes. The bar's current preoccupation with re-assuring nervous managers is misplaced. The
project is superfluous for most managers and futile for the rest. It
would take a revolutionary expansion of current confidentiality
doctrine to enable lawyers to promise a manager that she will not
be worse off for having confided in the lawyer. Moreover, in these
new regimes, the most important kind of trust lawyers need to
inculcate is not by managers in lawyers, but trust by regulators and
other participants in the regimes in their clients. Such trust is the
pre-condition of the autonomy and flexibility the new regimes
contemplate. Lawyer disclosure duties are entirely compatible
with this latter kind of trust.
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Of course, many areas of law have been unaffected by the
new regulatory models, and in those that have been affected, the
models have been imperfectly implemented. Transparency norms
are often weak or weakly enforced. Prosecutorial discretion can be
arbitrary and can impose large costs on relatively well-behaved
companies. Prosecutors often respond to voluntary transparency,
not by leniency, but by seizing on the opportunity for an easy and
potentially highly publicized victory. Once they invest resources in
an investigation, they are reluctant, even if they find little or
nothing, to close it with nothing to show for their effort. And of
course, transparency opens the company to private litigation,
especially class action suits, a process which corporate executives
deeply (and to my mind, plausibly) distrust as rife with
arbitrariness and opportunism.
The arguments that corporate counsel make in private for
confidentiality, as opposed to the public ones I've been criticizing,
usually emphasize defects such as these in the public and private
enforcement processes. Corporate lawyers and their clients value
confidentiality as a defense against opportunistic prosecutors or
class action lawyers. A small quantum of evidence, perhaps taken
out of context, is sometimes enough to permit these actors to
impose, or threaten to impose, enormous procedural costs on
businesses that may plausibly believe they are largely blameless.
There are, of course, direct responses to these dangers.
Some of the same mechanisms of transparency and accountability
that the new regulatory regimes impose on businesses are readily
adaptable to the conduct of agencies and prosecutors themselves.
Prosecutors should articulate standards for the exercise of
discretion; measure their performance under the standards; provide
transparent procedures for revising the standards in the light of
experience, and provide remedies for targets that believe they have
been harmed by violations of the standards.39 Recent class action
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reform has not eliminated the extortionate potential of the
procedure; more reform would be desirable.
Confidentiality is not a substitute for reforms that directly
address defects in the judicial process. It may help some
companies avoid meritless charges and wasteful proceedings, but
from a social point of view, confidentiality makes things worse.
Confidentiality can be asserted to block access to evidence for
meritorious claims as easily as for meritless ones. It makes all
claims more difficult and expensive to bring.
It is easy to imagine a role for lawyer organizations in
addressing litigation abuses, but there are no outstanding examples.
The ABA has no commission on class action abuses or regulatory
enforcement discretion. Instead, it gives us a Task Force on
Confidentiality. No doubt conflicts among its vast membership
over the first two topics make them difficult for the organization to
address. Confidentiality is a lowest common denominator. But a
more specialized voluntary bar might plausibly take on these
issues.
Finally, let me briefly observe that the tax shelter practice
addressed by IRS Circular 230 raises a further critical issue about
the meaning of client loyalty. A central aspect of tax shelter
practice is a legal opinion that the statutory interpretation on which
the deal is based is valid, or perhaps "more likely than not" to be
upheld if litigated. Whether given to clients or nonclients, these
opinions are always "third party" opinions in an important sense.
Although they are framed as advice to the client, this is not their
purpose. The client seeks the opinion so that in the event of IRS
challenge she can bolster her argument that she believed in "good
faith" that the transaction was valid, and hence should not be
subject to penalties.
Here we have situation in which, in the guise of giving
advice to their clients, lawyers confer on them immunity from
public sanctions. The selfish interests of lawyers and clients would
best be served if confidentiality could also be claimed for such
transactions. That way, clients could play the "audit lottery" and
then pull out the letter only if they should be detected. But
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whatever the strength of the arguments for confidentiality in the
usual context, they are hard to take at all seriously when the lawyer
is, not so much giving legal advice, as exercising a power of public
dispensation. Thus, the IRS's elaborate and ingenious tax shelter
regulations designed to make tax shelter practice more transparent
and accountable.40
Note that in this context lawyers have assumed an
intermediating public-private role that has some resemblance to the
one I suggested new regulatory trends called for more generally.
In principle, the function of the opinion is both to inform the client
and to re-assure the IRS of the client's good faith. This
development illustrates that the idea of a more public lawyering
role is not as radical as it might sounds. But of course, it also
shows that such a role can be corrupted. The new regimes do not
dispense with the need for adequate sanctions -- especially with
respect to disclosure norms -- and monitoring. And they require
new methods of accountability for lawyers. Although they are not
adequate in the absence of effective penalties or auditing resources,
the IRS rules move in precisely the right direction. In effect, the
IRS is moving toward auditing lawyers and accountants, as a
means of assessing the reliability of their vouching for their clients.
This is the logic of the new regime.
III. CONCLUSION
In confronting the crisis, lawyers have two options that
parallel the choices that the new regulatory environment presents
their clients. The low road -- the one that demands least effort and
imagination but has the least promise of neutralizing the threats to
public respect and independence -- is the one it seems to be taking.
This involves clinging to the prerogatives of formalism and an
interpretation of confidentiality that rationalizes treating managers
as if they were clients. The high road -- the most difficult in the
40
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short run but the one with the most promise for the profession and
its role in society -- requires the rejection of formalism and of the
tacit managerialism of current confidentiality efforts. It requires
lawyers to interpret their professed commitment to law in terms of
spirit and purpose rather than literal terms. And it requires them to
confront explicitly the tensions of organizational client loyalty, and
especially recognizing the tension between client loyalty and
managerial loyalty.
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